Rothbard vs. CATO’s Richard Epstein on the Benefits of Violent Looting

Adam Liptak and Richard Epstein discuss the most efficient way to rob people.

After listening to Epstein run his ivory tower mouth, my fury over his nonsensical bullshit hath runneth over.  A video reading of the following article can be found here for those of you that don’t have the patience to read long text articles.

Epstein admits that, “There is no coercive action by government which will have the same beneficent effects of voluntary transactions in competitive markets,” yet flushes his own statement down the toilet when he adds, “but you can’t get competitive markets with respect to the provision of public goods and you can’t get competitive markets with respect to the operation of network industries.”

Epstein never bothers to explain why “public goods” are of such necessary importance that VIOLENCE against PEACEFUL PEOPLE should be advocated in order to pay for them.

Epstein lists off a few so-called libertarian economists that support the initiation of violence against the innocent to pay for public goods, including Locke and Hayek, but he never bothers to mention the rest of the libertarian economics field, the majority of which disagree with the legitimization of the initiation of violence.

Let’s start off with the parable of the robber by Rothbard to demonstrate why any violent theft can not lead to a more productive society.  The following citations all come from the essay The Myth of Neutral Taxationby Murray Rothbard:

A thief now appears, making his living by robbing and coercively preying on others: The robber obtains his income by presenting the victim with a choice: your money or your life (or, at least, your health) – and the victim then yields his assets. Or, to be more precise, the robber presents the victim with a choice between paying immediately or waiting until the robber injures him.  In this situation both parties do not benefit; instead, the robber benefits precisely at the expense of the victim. Instead of the consumer’s paying, guiding, and being benefited by the producer’s activity, the robber is benefiting from the victim’s payment. The robber benefits to the extent that the victim pays and loses. Instead of helping expand the amount and degree of production in society, the robber is parasitically draining off that production. Whereas an expanded market encourages increases in production and supply, theft discourages production and contracts the market.

Rothbard continues by comparing the parable of the thief to the State:

We are now in a position to analyze government and its relationship to the market. Economists have generally depicted the government as a voluntary social institution providing important services to the public. The modern “public choice” theorists have perhaps gone furthest with this approach. Government is considered akin to a business firm, supplying its services to the consumer-voters, while the voters in turn pay voluntarily for these services. All in all, government is treated by conventional economists as a part of the market, and therefore, as in the case of a business firm or a membership organization, either totally or in part neutral to the market.

It is true that if taxation were voluntary and the government akin to a business firm, the government would be neutral to the market. We contend here, however, that the model of government is akin, not to the business firm, but to the criminal organization, and indeed that the State is the organization of robbery systematized and writ large. The State is the only legal institution in society that acquires its revenue by the use of coercion, by using enough violence and threat of violence on its victims to ensure their paying the desired tribute. The State benefits itself at the expense of its robbed victims. The State is, therefore, a centralized, regularized organization of theft. Its payments extracted by coercion are called “taxation” instead of tribute, but their nature is the same. The German sociologist Franz Oppenheimer saw this clearly when he wrote that

there are two fundamentally opposed means whereby man, requiring sustenance, is impelled to obtain the necessary means for satisfying his desires. These are work and robbery, one’s own labor and the forcible appropriation of the labor of others.. .. I propose .. . to call one’s own labor and the equivalent exchange of one’s own labor for the labor of others, the “economic means” for the satisfaction of needs, while the unrequited appropriation of the labor of others will be called the “political means.”

Oppenheimer then proceeded to identify the State as the “organization of the political means.”  Or, as the libertarian writer Albert Jay Nock, vividly put it: “The State claims and exercises the monopoly of crime…. It forbids private murder, but itself organizes murder on a colossal scale. It punishes private theft, but itself lays unscrupulous hands on anything it wants, whether the property of citizen or alien.”  Or, as Ludwig von Mises points out, this regularization establishes a systematic coercive hegemonic bond between the rulers of the State and the subject that contrasts vividly with the contractual bond of mutual benefit.

There are two different kinds of social cooperation: cooperation by virtue of contract and coordination, and cooperation by virtue of command and subordination or hegemony. Where and as far as cooperation is based on contract, the logical relation between the cooperating parties is symmetrical. They are all parties to interpersonal exchange contracts. John has the same relation to Tom as Tom has to John. Where and as far as cooperation is based on command and subordination, there is the man who commands and there are those who obey his order. The logical relation between these two classes of men is asymmetrical. There is a director and there are people under his care. The director alone chooses and directs; the others – the wards – are mere pawns in his actions.

In this coercive, hegemonic condition, the individual must either accept the orders of the ruler or rebel. To the extent that the person submits, this choice then subjects him to the continuing hegemony of the rulers of the State. Contrasting the contractual and the hegemonic, Mises states:

In the frame of a contractual society the individual members exchange definite quantities of goods and services of a definite quality. In choosing subjection in a hegemonic body a man neither gives nor receives anything that is definite. He integrates himself into a system in which he has to render indefinite services and will receive what the director is willing to assign to him. He is at the mercy of the director. The director alone is free to choose. Whether the director is an individual or an organized group of individuals, a directorate, and whether the director is a selfish maniacal tyrant or a benevolent paternal despot is of no relevance for the structure of the whole system.

Mises goes on to contrast the system of contractual coordination that is responsible for much of the achievements of Western civilization with the hegemonic system embodied in the State, “an apparatus of compulsion and coercion… by necessity a hegemonic organization.”

So we have Rothbard, Mises and Nock all explaining quite clearly that the application of violence leads always to a worse economic condition for society as well as creating a condition of general tyranny.

Now let’s see what Rothbard has to say about Epstein’s bullshit claim of “public goods” necessitating violence against the innocent.

Collective Goods

More intellectually respectable is the contention that insofar as government supplies society with “collective goods” or “public goods,” it is supplying a necessary service and is in a sense voluntary and neutral to the market. Collective goods are goods that allegedly cannot be supplied on the private market because they are indivisible and therefore cannot be allocated by having individual consumers pay for their own portions of the product. No consumer can be excluded from receiving the good. Like the sun, collective goods shine on all alike, and none can be made to pay for the service. Professor Buchanan, sympathetic to the idea of an “ideally neutral fiscal system,” defines it as one that “uniquely aims at providing the social group with some ‘optimal’ or ‘efficient’ quantity of collective goods and services.” Then, if “the fiscal system is conceived as the means through which collective goods and services are provided to members of the society without any subsidiary or supplementary social purposes,” we have, says Buchanan, an “analogy with the market economy.” The fiscal system is then “ideally neutral” to the market economy. [23]

In the first place, even if there were such things as collective goods, government supply would establish neither its voluntarism nor its neutrality. Even if there were no other way to supply these services, taxation to provide them is still compulsory. And since it is coercive, there is no standard, as there is on the market, to decide how much of these services to supply by taxation. And the more the government provides, the less people are allowed to spend on their own private consumption.

Furthermore, if there exists but one anarchist in any society, the very existence of the State coercively supplying a collective good constitutes a great psychic harm to that anarchist. The anarchist, therefore, receives not a collective service but an individual harm from the operations of the State. It follows therefore that the good or service cannot be truly collective; its “service” is separable, and distinctly negative, to the anarchists. Hence, the good can neither be truly collective (indivisible, and positive) nor can it be voluntary. [24]

No matter how “divisible” the service, furthermore, a collective good is not quite like the sun: The more resources the government expends, the greater will be its output. These resources will have to be extracted from other potential products. Take, for example, “defense” or police protection, which is often considered to be provided as a homogeneous lump to everyone. But every good or service in the world, “collective” ones included, is provided, not in lump sum, but in marginal units. Yet strangely, economists, trained to think of marginal units everywhere else, suddenly start referring to defense as a “lump” when discussing government. In reality, however, there is a vast range of “defense” services that the government (or any other defense agency) could supply to its customers. To take two polar extremes, the government could supply one unarmed policeman for an entire country, or it could sink most of the national product into providing an armed bodyguard, replete with tank and flame throwers, for every citizen. The question that must be answered by any defense agency is not whether or not to supply defense, but how much defense to supply to whom? In the same way, the question confronting a steel company is not whether or not to produce steel, but how much steel of various grades and types to supply.

But this failure to provide rational criteria for amounts and types of collective services is an inherent flaw in any provision by government. The market’s price system and profit-and-loss test tell private firms how much of what kind of steel to produce; rational criteria for satisfying consumers most efficiently are inherent in the free market. But government can have no such criteria. Since the consumers of defense do not pay for the service, since taxes do not measure the service, and since the government does not have to worry about losses that can be recouped by further taxation, there are no criteria of how much defense to provide to whom. Decisions are purely arbitrary, as well as coercive. If, on the other hand, defense were provided by private firms on the market, then these firms would, as in the rest of the market, supply efficiently the amounts and types of protection desired by particular customers. Those customers, for example, who desired and were willing to pay for round-the-clock bodyguards would do so; those who felt no need for protection – or pacifists aghast at the very idea – would pay nothing; and there might be a large spectrum of services in between.

More specifically: Only a minority of specific individuals find themselves in actual need of police or judicial protection during any given period. If A and B are attacked, the police can spring to the aid of these specific persons. It will be objected that even if only a few persons are actually attacked at any one time, no one can determine who will be attacked in the future, and so everyone will want to be sure of protection in advance, thus salvaging the notion of a “collective want.” But, again, there will be a spectrum of opinion among individuals. Some persons may feel pretty sure that they will not be attacked, and will therefore be willing to opt out of protection, to take their chance rather than pay a protection tax. Others will be confident of their own ability to repulse an attack, or would only patronize another, competing private defense agency. Others may fear an attack so little that the cost of paying protection will not be worth the benefit. On the free market, individuals would be free to choose any or none of these protection-insurance packages.

Even if it be conceded that not all people demand protection, it might still be argued that defense is a “collective good” because no one can be excluded from receiving its benefits. But surely if the inhabitants of a particular block refuse to pay for the police protection, the police may simply exclude that block from its patrols or other services. In the case of judicial protection, the conventional case for a collective good is even weaker. For surely a court, financed by voluntary payment (either by insurance premium or by fee-for-service), can refuse to hear the case of a nonpaying plaintiff. Even in the case of national defense, which seems to be a particularly strong example of a collective good, the pacifist or anarchist receives a harm rather than a good, and exclusion can be practiced in such ways as not rushing troops or planes to defend nonpaying areas, or at the very least not to defend them as rapidly and as diligently as areas that do pay.

Thus defense cannot be a collective good so long as only one pacifist or one anarchist exists in the society, for these persons will receive a harm rather than a benefit when they receive the “service” of coercive defense. And defense is not a collective good because its recipients can be excluded and separated.

Professor Kenneth Goldin is one of the very few economists to recognize that defense service is separable and not indivisible. He also points out that increased police service requires increased expense:

As communities grow, and more residents must be supplied with crime defense, most communities hire more policemen; clearly an increased cost. If more policemen are not hired, then new residents can be served only by decreasing service to others: more streets can be patrolled only if there are fewer patrols at night; more properties can be checked only if each one is checked less thoroughly, and only the more urgent calls can be responded to. Each of these service changes imposes costs on residents. Either they will suffer from more crime, or they will incur the costs of purchasing other types of crime defense. Many types of crime defense are selectively available such as locks, fences, guard dogs, guards, and also alarm companies which respond if the burglar alarm is tripped. And don’t overlook private police patrols, which check selected houses on selected streets, as thoroughly and as often as each customer requests, for a fee. [25]

Court services are clearly separable, and private arbitrators are indeed generally more efficient than government courts. Goldin adds:

To service more persons generally requires more judges and courtrooms. If more facilities are not acquired, additional users will impose costs on others, in the form of longer days for trial and/or less judicial time spent on each case. It is costless to serve additional persons only if they have no disputes.

To some extent, he goes on, even government courts charge fees to users and therefore charge for benefits received, although the fees usually do not vary with the difficulty of the case. And “private arbitrators are also available, selectively, to those parties willing to pay a fee. So, although adjudication is a fundamental service in any society, it does not follow that adjudication is a public good.” [26]

And even in the case of national defense, Goldin points out,

there is certainly some variation in protection, especially among cities (regarding protection by missiles), and among Americans who either travel or have property abroad. While the troops may be sent out to protect some Americans or their property from some foreign seizures (such as the Mayaguez), in other cases no action is taken (tuna boats). One of the firmly embedded myths of modern public finance is that it doesn’t matter if population increases: The costs of defending the U.S. from external attack will not change. But consider two points. First, the new population must live somewhere. If they cause an increase in the U.S. land area, then either more defenses must be provided, or there will be a decrease in the level of protection to earlier residents and either way the marginal cost of protecting additional persons is positive…. Second, even if the new population resides within the existing boundaries, they will generally increase the amount of physical and human wealth which might be coveted by an enemy. That is, foreign attack is (at least partially) an economically motivated action, and is more likely to occur if there is more capital worth coveting. [27]

Not only does total cost of national defense vary with population, but the service of protection against foreign attack can be variable. First, there once existed private armies, and such armies, serving private individuals or groups, still exist today. Goldin mentions the armies of religious groups in contemporary Lebanon, as well as a Central American army owned by Robert Vesco. These armies, as Goldin states, “yield benefits primarily to their owner.” [28]

Second, even a collective State army can vary its services to individual citizens:

A military force also protects people from theft of property and kidnapping by foreigners. Exclusion from this service is relatively easy: The military force simply makes no attempt to stop theft or kidnapping of named persons. These persons would either hire their own guards, or suffer the damages of theft or kidnapping by foreigners…. Americans with substantial property abroad or at sea might well prefer to provide their own anti-theft defenses, rather than pay for a communal army which cannot be counted on to protect their property…. Contrary to public goods theory, even in this key case of defense from external attack, exclusion is not impossible and the marginal cost of serving additional persons generally is not zero. [29]

Moreover, as Buchanan concedes, a collective defense may be a service to one citizen and be considered a distinctly negative “service” by another:

The common availability of collective goods or services does not, of course, imply that similar evaluations are placed on these by different persons. The Vietnam War effort demonstrated this point. The services of the plane that bombed North Vietnam in October, 1968, were equally available to all U.S. citizens. But the value placed on these services may have ranged from significantly positive levels … to significantly negative levels for those who felt that continued bombing was both immoral and a barrier to peace negotiations. [30]

To Professor Buchanan, the “classic” example of a collective good is the lighthouse. The beams of the lighthouse are indivisible: “If one boat gets all the light beams, all boats may do likewise.” [31] Or, as Samuelson has put it, “A businessman could not build it for a profit, since he cannot claim a price from each user.” [32] The theory is that it would be virtually impossible for a lighthouse keeper to row out to each boat to demand payment for use of the light. And that hence lighthouses have always been supplied by government.

But, first, the problem has now been eliminated by modern technology. It is now technologically highly feasible for a lighthouse’s rays to be available only to that boat that has the proper electronic equipment, and to pay a fee for the use of that equipment. But, apart from this, it turns out, as Ronald Coase has discovered, that from the seventeenth until the early nineteenth centuries, the British lighthouse system was developed and operated by private enterprise. The lighthouse owners hardly bothered about collecting a fee from each boat on the spot. Instead, the owners employed agents at ports who found out what routes each ship entering the port had sailed and therefore what lighthouses the ship had passed and charged them accordingly. [33] Furthermore, additional users of lighthouses will impose higher costs for providing them. More ships will increase the likelihood of congestion in the protected waters and will require more navigational aids. [34]

In his trenchant critique of the offhanded way in which economists, from Mill to Samuelson and Arrow, have wrongly used the lighthouse as an example of a collective good, Coase concludes:

These references by economists to lighthouses are not the result of their having made a study of lighthouses or having read a detailed study by some other economist. Despite the extensive use of the lighthouse example in the literature, no economist, to my knowledge, has ever made a comprehensive study of lighthouse finance and administration. The lighthouse is simply plucked out of the air to serve as an illustration….

This seems to me to be the wrong approach…. [G]eneralizations are not likely to be helpful unless they are derived from studies of how such activities are actually carried out within different institutional frameworks.…

The account in this paper of the British lighthouse system … shows that, contrary to the belief of many economists, a lighthouse service can be provided by private enterprise…. The lighthouses were built, operated, financed and owned by private individuals, who could sell the lighthouse or dispose of it by bequest. The role of the government was limited to the establishment and enforcement of property rights in the lighthouse. The charges were collected at ports by agents from the lighthouses. The problem of enforcement was no different for them than for other suppliers of goods and services to the shipowner. [35]

The analogous navigational aid for air traffic, the services of the air-control tower, can be and is sold separately to individual consumers. Control towers will distribute radar information, for example, to whoever has radar equipment, but the equipment must be purchased by individual users. And heavier use of airspace or airport runways requires more navigational aids and therefore more expenses to service the users. [36]

Radio and television have been cited as collective goods since servicing another viewer allegedly involves no additional cost. But additional service is far from costless, and viewers are separable and excludable; therefore radio and TV fail both tests of a collective good. An increased viewing audience means supplying more, and more varied, programs. And new users must either be supplied with a stronger signal or may require cable or stronger antennas because of the increased congestion. Moreover, consumers are excluded now from television. To watch television programs they must buy sets and then must either pay as they go (various forms of pay TV) or else advertisers must pay, imposing on many viewers the psychic costs of commercials. And public television imposes on its viewers the psychic costs of being subjected to lengthy requests for donations. [37]

Moreover, in a sense the collective goods case for radio and television proves too much. For movies may also be said to be “costless” if additional viewers fill empty seats in a theater. Must movies, too, be nationalized, be supplied only by government, and perhaps be free to all?

Research has also been termed a “collective good”; don’t we all enjoy the benefits of the research and inventions of Edison, Faraday, et al., without paying for them? But of course we do pay for the fruits of research, and we pay separably. For we must purchase the papers or books of researchers, or pay fees for lectures, demonstrations, or consulting. Those who do not pay such fees are excluded from learning of or absorbing these new ideas. And, of course, the holders of patents and copyrights are able to obtain the income from these inventions or discoveries while excluding other producers. [38]

Again, this argument proves too much. For not only patents and inventions are produced by creators: There is also art, sculpture, music, literature, philosophy. Are we to say that all these products of the human spirit are “collective goods” because we cannot be fully excluded from enjoying the products of Beethoven, Shakespeare, or Vermeer? Must all artists therefore be nationalized?

Another commonly cited example of a collective good is insect control by airplane spraying. It is alleged to be impossible to exclude land underneath from being sprayed, and the marginal cost of adding more land sprayed is zero. But if new residents live in previously uninhabited areas, then extra cost is incurred in servicing them, and the same is true if they are engaged in activities that attract insects. More airplane time and fuel must be used as well as more spray. Furthermore, the airplane could often, if it wished, exclude specific parcels of land from its spray. And more important, many of those receiving this “service” have not wanted it and have objected to the spraying as vigorously as the pacifist has protested the use of violence in defense. Indeed, a shift in public attitudes toward chemical sprays has greatly reduced their use in recent years. But if some people consider a service such as a spray as “bad,” how can it be an indivisible, positive collective good?

Moreover, as Goldin points out, individual consumers have another option: to buy their own spray guns and spray their own property. In that case, each individual could choose and pay for the type and amount of spray that he precisely desires. [39]

For many reasons, then, there are no collective goods, and even if there were, as we have already seen, their supply would be coercive if furnished by government and taxation. But there is yet another vital point: For even if a good or service could only be supplied “collectively,” why must that collection be compulsory? Why couldn’t individuals pool their resources voluntarily, as in club dues, and make voluntary contributions for the supply of the service? [40] Or, as Gustave de Molinari argued, couldn’t a government even contract for the supply of collective services with private, competitive, and therefore more efficient firms? [41]

Or, as Spencer Heath urged, on the model of real estate developments, shopping centers, and hotels, couldn’t such “collective” or “public” goods as police, fire, roads, sanitation, and so on, be supplied by a large private firm with tenants paying for these services in their rents? [42]

Finally, if we look at human history, we find that every good, without exception, that economists glibly term a “collective good” has actually been successfully supplied by the free market. Not only do private guards and patrols exist, and private lighthouses in the past, but there have been societies, such as medieval Ireland, that supplied a complex network of defense service and insurance – including police, crime insurance, and competitive courts – without a State or taxation. Competing market courts serviced for centuries the vitally important fairs of Champagne in the Middle Ages. Common-law courts were marked by competitive, nongovernmentally appointed judges. Private guards and private arbitrators exist successfully even in our society where the State monopolizes most forms of defense. [43]

It seems clear, then, that voluntary rather than governmental supply of the collective good would be possible in every case; the only objection might be, not that the good – defense, firefighting, or whatever – could not be supplied, but that “too little” would be supplied. But that brings us to the second line of argument by the proponents of government.

External Benefits

If forced to retreat from the “strong” concept of collective goods, the advocates of government supply or subsidization of such goods, fall back on a “weak,” and therefore more plausible argument. Even though every collective good might be furnishable by private means, “not enough” will be supplied because of the difficulty or impossibility of capturing enough payment from “free riders” who benefit from these services without paying for their benefits. Government supply, or taxation of free riders to subsidize supplies, then becomes required in order to “internalize the external benefits” acquired, but not paid for, by the free riders. [44]

But this argument generates far more difficulties than it solves. It proves too much in many directions. In the first place, how much of the deficient good should be supplied? What criterion can the State have for deciding the optimal amount and for gauging by how much the market provision of the service falls short? Even if free riders benefit from collective service X, in short, taxing them to pay for producing more will deprive them of unspecified amounts of private goods Y, Z, and so on. We know from their actions that these private consumers wish to continue to purchase private goods Y, Z, and so on, in various amounts. But where is their analogous demonstrated preference for the various collective goods? We know that a tax will deprive the free riders of various amounts of their cherished private goods, but we have no idea how much benefit they will acquire from the increased provision of the collective good; and so we have no warrant whatever for believing that the benefits will be greater than the imposed costs. The presumption should be quite the reverse. And what of those individuals who dislike the collective goods, pacifists who are morally outraged at defensive violence, environmentalists who worry over a dam destroying snail darters, and so on? In short, what of those persons who find other people’s good their “bad?” Far from being free riders receiving external benefits, they are yoked to absorbing psychic harm from the supply of these goods. Taxing them to subsidize more defense, for example, will impose a further twofold injury on these hapless persons: once by taxing them, and second by supplying more of a hated service.

Since the tax-and-subsidy, or government-operation, route abandons the process of the market, there is no way of knowing who the “negative free riders” are, and how much they will be suffering from an increased tax. We do have a pretty good idea, however, that one or more of these people exists: that there is at least one pacifist, anti-dam environmentalist, anarchist opposed to all government actions, and so on, in every society. But in that case, the free-rider as well as the “stronger” collective-good argument for the neutrality of government falls to the ground.

The young Herbert Spencer, in his great treatise Social Statics, declared that an individual should be able to opt out of taxation, to “ignore the State,” and to renounce its services. [45] Criticizing his own work a half-century later, Spencer, in his Autobiography, employs the free-rider argument. “Mr. Spencer,” he charges,

actually contends that the citizen may properly refuse to pay taxes, if at the same time he surrenders the advantages which State aid and State protection yield him! But how can he surrender them? In whatever way he maintains himself, he must make use of sundry appliances which are indirectly due to governmental organization; and he cannot avoid benefiting by the social order which government maintains. Even if he lives on a moor and makes shoes, he cannot sell his goods or buy the things he wants without using the road to the neighboring town, and profiting by the paving and perhaps the lighting when he gets there. And, though he may say he does not want police guardianship, yet, in keeping down footpads and burglars, the police necessarily protect him, whether he asks them or not. Surely it is manifest … that the citizen is so entangled in the organization of his own society that he can neither escape the evils nor relinquish the benefits which come to him from it. [46]

The later Spencer was properly refuted, on his own earlier grounds, by “S.R.” “S.R.” points out first that on the later Spencer’s own grounds, a man at least has the right to refuse to pay for advantages that he can relinquish. “S.R.” then quotes from the earlier Spencer’s application of his “law of equal freedom”:

If every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man, then he is free to stop connection with the State – to relinquish its protection and to refuse paying toward its support. It is self-evident that in so behaving he in no way trenches upon the liberty of others; for his position is a passive one, and while passive he cannot become an aggressor.. .. He cannot be coerced into a political combination without a breach of the law of equal freedom; he can withdraw from it without committing any such breach; and he therefore has the right to withdraw.

“S.R.” then proceeds: “Is a man who refuses to pay for incidental advantages he has not solicited an aggressor? Is it a breach of the law of equal freedom to withdraw from a combination that, in working for itself and pursuing its own benefit, indirectly benefits one who is perfectly willing to forego the blessings of the uninvited beneficence?” “S.R.” then points out that Spencer is implicitly modifying his equal freedom formula to say that anyone can do whatever he wishes, provided not only that he does not infringe on anyone else’s freedom, but also provided “that no one confers upon him benefits which he cannot wholly surrender while remaining a producer and trader.”

“S.R.” then tellingly supplies the logical reductio of the free-rider argument:

Has an individual the right to withhold proper contributions from neighbors who, individually or collectively, benefit him by caring for their own interests? If my neighbors hire private watchmen, they benefit me indirectly and incidentally. If my neighbors build fine houses or cultivate gardens, they indirectly minister to my pleasure. Are they entitled to tax me for these benefits because I cannot “surrender” them? [47]

Thus the free-rider argument proves far too much. After all, civilization itself is a process of all of us “free-riding” on the achievements of others. We all free-ride, every day, on the achievements of Edison, Beethoven, or Vermeer. When capital investment increases, and technology improves, the real wages of workers and the standard of living of consumers increase, even though they have contributed nothing to these advances. By simply continuing to work and consume, laborers and consumers receive the benefits of the inventions and investments of others without paying for them. So what must we infer from this? Are we all to wear sackcloth and ashes? If our neighbors are wiser, prettier, or happier, we all benefit in countless ways. So what must we do about it? Must we all be taxed to subsidize their beauty and wisdom?

And if people feel that not enough beauty, wisdom, inventions, police protection, and so on, will be provided by consumer payment and because of free riders, they are perfectly at liberty to subsidize provision of such goods on their own, individually or through societies or foundations. By doing so, the donor will demonstrate that, to him, the expected psychic benefit from his subsidy is worth more than the money he pays.

It will be objected that potential donors will not donate if they are rankled by the spectacle of free riders who stubbornly refuse to donate for the benefits they receive. And, further, that consumers on the market will not be willing to purchase these goods if they know that free riders abound. If we wished to moralize here, we might respond that these persons might be well advised to attend to their own affairs without wallowing in envy at benefits received by others. But, in any case, if the rankling at the existence of free riders is strong enough, these persons are always free to boycott the miscreants, either by not trading with them or by general ostracism. [48]

The consumers or donors can also, if they wish, get around the free-rider problem by making contracts, either singly or in organized fashion, that will pay for the “collective good,” but only on condition that everyone else, including the potential free riders, pay as well. This form of contract would enable those willing to pay, in effect, to put the choice to the free riders: Either you join in paying or the service will not be provided. [49]